International law - a constitution for mankind? : an attempt at a re-appraisal with an analysis of constitutional principles by Kadelbach, Stefan & Kleinlein, Thomas
 
 
 
International Law – a Constitution for Mankind? 
An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional 
Principles 
 
Prof. Dr. Stefan Kadelbach, Dr. Thomas Kleinlein 
Cluster of Excellence 
The Formation of Normative Orders 
FB 01: Rechtswissenschaft / Institut für Öffentliches Recht 
www.normativeorders.net 
Grüneburgplatz 1 
60323 Frankfurt am Main 
s.kadelbach@jur.uni-frankfurt.de 
t.kleinlein@jur.uni-frankfurt.de 
 
 
 
Published in:  
German Yearbook of International Law 50 (2007), ersch. 2008 
 
 
 
 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-
Commercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Germany License. To view a 
copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/3.0/de/deed.en_GB. 2 
 
 
International Law – a Constitution for Mankind?∗
An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional Principles 
 
 
By Stefan Kadelbach and Thomas Kleinlein 
 
 
A. Introduction 
One of the current trends in international law scholarship is the question of which influences 
specific legal cultures have on the understanding of international law.
1
This contribution will trace the conditions of a German perspective and analyse the debate 
against the background of positive law. We will try to assess what the debate adds to the 
general theory of international law, how it fits into demands of legitimacy of international 
governance, and whether it contributes to a sensible reconstruction of current law. 
Furthermore, we try to develop our own perspective that matches the system of international 
law and is plausible in terms of international legal theory. For that purpose, we will first take 
 It is probably in this 
context that the contention has to be understood that the ongoing debate on the 
constitutionalisation of public international law is particularly European, if not German. 
Whether or not this is the case is difficult to investigate with a lawyer’s tools. However, the 
idea that international law is the constitution of mankind has found many adherents in 
German legal writings. 
                                                           
∗  For earlier versions of some of the theses presented in this essay see Stefan Kadelbach,  Überstaatliches 
Verfassungsrecht, Festschrift Koresuke Yamauchi (2006), 181; id./Thomas Kleinlein,  Überstaatliches 
Verfassungsrecht, AVR 44 (2006), 235. The authors thank Helmut Aust, Munich, Tilmann Geckeler, Office of 
the Legal Advisor, The International Labour Organization, Geneva, Niels Petersen, Bonn, and Jan Sieckmann, 
Buenos Aires, for valuable ideas and comments. We are also grateful to Stefano Sicardi and Sergio Dellavalle, 
Torino, Ingolf Pernice and Daniel Thym, Berlin, as well as Gunther Teubner, Rudolf Wiethölter and Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano, Frankfurt, for the opportunity to present some of the core ideas in their seminars and for their 
critical remarks. 
1 See symposia “American-European Dialogue”, ZaöRV 64 (2004), 255; “The US and International Law”, EJIL 
15 (2004), 617 et seq.; “Europe and International Law”, EJIL 15 (2004), 857; “Perspectives on Europe and 
International Law”, EJIL 16 (2005), 25; M. Janis, The American Tradition in International Law, Vol. 1: Great 
Expectations, 1789-1914  (2004);  Enzo  Cannizzaro,  La doctrine italienne et le développement du droit 
international, AFDI 2001, 1; William  E. Butler, The Law of Treaties in Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States: Text and Commentary (2002); Michael Stolleis/Masaharu Yanagihara (eds.), East Asian 
and European Perspectives on International Law (2004); Berdal Aral, An Inquiry into the Turkish ‘School’ of 
International Law, EJIL 16 (2005), 769; Ram Prakash Anand, Development of Modern International Law and 
India (2005); Anthony Carty, Conservative and Progressive Visions in French International Legal Doctrine, EJIL 
16 (2005), 525; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, EJIL 17 (2006), 315. 3 
 
up the debate and find its place in the landscape of international legal theory. In this context, 
we try to shed light on the central concepts used or presupposed when constitutionalisation 
is discussed by German-speaking scholars (see below, section B). Furthermore, we will 
discuss structures in positive law which are used as arguments in the debate (section C). 
Finally, we will try to give an account of constitutionalisation in terms of both sources doctrine 
and legal theory (section D), before drawing conclusions from the discussion (section E).  
 
B. Constitutional Approaches Beyond the State 
I. Structure of the Debate 
Under the heading of constitutionalisation in international law, different issues are being 
discussed. They range from the erosion of state consent as a requirement in international 
law-making and the accruement of universal norms, the enclosure of global community 
interests in international law and its hierarchisation through the entrenchment of fundamental 
norms, the intertwinement and functional complemantarity of international and national 
(constitutional) law to questions of statehood and recognition.
2
To be sure, constitutionalisation and constitutionalism beyond the state not only is a subject 
for public international lawyers, but raises questions of political philosophy
 These developments, which 
can either be based on regional and sectoral integration or take place on the universal scale, 
also raise questions about the legitimacy of public international law. 
3 and international 
relations theory.
4  International lawyers have focused on different aspects. Whilst some 
primarily refer to fundamental norms,
5 others are concerned with the constitutional dimension 
of the founding treaties of international organisations. Constitutional approaches to 
constituent treaties amount to their comparative study
6 or refer to the dynamism inherent in 
the very concept of a constitution. This dynamism is regarded as providing the basis for a 
special reading of these documents, different from ordinary multilateral treaties.
7
                                                           
2 For surveys of developments and academic discussions, see Jochen A. Frowein, Konstitutionalisierung des 
Völkerrechts, Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 39 (2000), 427; Anne Peters, Compensatory 
Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, Leiden JIL 
19 (2006), 579; Bardo Fassbender, Grund und Grenzen der konstitutionellen Idee im Völkerrecht, Festschrift 
Josef Isensee (2007), 73. 
 Quite in 
3 See e.g. the focus on cosmopolitism in DZPhil 53 (2005), 1, 46 et seq. 
4 See e.g. Michael Zürn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates (2005). 
5 Juan-Antonio Carillo-Salcedo, Droit international et souveraineté des Etats, RdC 257 (1996), 35, 146; Robert 
Kolb, Théorie du ius cogens international (2001), 28; Antonio Cassese, International Law (2
nd ed. 2005), 198 et 
seq. 
6 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), 153. 
7 Ervin P. Hexner, Teleological Interpretations of Basic Instruments of Public International Organizations, in: 
Essays in Honor of Hans Kelsen (1964), 119; Thomas Franck, Book Review, Harv. LR 77 (1964), 1565; Shabtai 4 
 
contrast, constitutionalism is also understood to place limits on the activities of international 
organisations.
8 For some, the U.N. Charter is the constitution not only of an international 
organisation, but also of the international community itself.
9 Some contributions particularly 
accentuate the multi-level dimension of constitutionalism.
10 Others mainly deal with different 
aspects of the relationship between national and international constitutionalism.
11
More or less closely connected with these debates are variants of general systems theory 
which assert the emergence of a global constitution effectuating the structural coupling of 
global law and global governance 
 
12 or extend the perspective to global civil constitutions in 
the fragmentation of global law.
13
International or global constitutionalism is not so much a public international law theory of its 
own as it is a particular doctrinal approach within the positivist mainstream of public 
international law scholarship. It tries to interpret developments in international law as a trend 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (1989), 181 et seq.; Bardo Fassbender, The United 
Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community, Colum.J.Transnat’l L. 36 (1998), 529, 568 et 
seq.; Jose E. Alvarez, Constitutional interpretation in international organizations, in: Jean-Marc Coicaud/Veijo 
Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Organizations (2001), 104. 
8 For a critique of the “paradoxes” of this account see Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, I.O.L.R. 1 (2004), 
31. 
9 R. St. J. Macdonald, The United Nations Charter: Constitution or Contract?, in: id./Douglas M. Johnston (eds.), 
The Structure and Process of International Law (1983), 889; Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter As a 
Constitution, Pace Y.B. Int’l L. 61 (1989), 61;  Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the 
Charter of the United Nations Revisited, Max Planck UNYB 1 (1997), 1; Fassbender, Colum.J.Transnat’l L. 36 
(1998), 529; Ronald Macdonald, The Charter of the United Nations in Constitutional Perspective, 
Austl.Y.B.Int’l L. 20 (1999), 205; Thomas Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a Constitution?, Festschrift Tono Eitel 
(2003), 95. 
10 Rainer Wahl, Der Einzelne in der Welt jenseits des Staates, Der Staat 40 (2001), 45; id., Internationalisierung 
des Staates, Festschrift Alexander Hollerbach (2001), 193, Thomas Cottier/Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st 
Century Constitutionalism, Max Planck UNYB 7 (2003), 261; Joakim Nergelius et al. (eds.), Challenges of 
multi-level constitutionalism (2003); Ingolf Pernice, The Global Dimension of Multilevel Constitutionalism: A 
Legal Response to the Challenges of Globalisation, Festschrift Christian Tomuschat (2006), 973. For a federalist 
theory of supranational constitutionalism see Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of 
Art. 2(7) and Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, Tex.Int’l L.J. 31 (1996), 353. 
11 Brun-Otto Bryde, Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationalisierung des Verfassungsrechts, 
Der Staat 42 (2003),  61;  id., International Democratic Constitutionalism, in: Ronald St. John 
Macdonald/Douglas M. Johnston  (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism (2005), 103;  Mattias Kumm, 
International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist 
Model, Va.J.Int’l L. 44 (2003), 19; id., The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis, EJIL 15 (2004), 907; id.,  Democratic constitutionalism encounters international law: terms of 
engagement, in: Sujit Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2006), 256; Peters, Leiden JIL 19 
(2006), 579, 580. 
12 Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Die Emergenz der Globalverfassung, ZaöRV 63 (2003), 717; id., Globalverfassung 
(2005). For a review see Lars Viellechner, AVR 45 (2007), 294. 
13 Gunther Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie, ZaöRV 
63 (2003), 1; id., Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory, in: Christian 
Joerges/Inger-Johanne Sand/id. (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (2004), 3;  Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano/Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of 
Global Law, Mich.J.Int’l L.  25 (2004), 999. Critical towards the use of constitutional terminology in that 
context: Thomas Vesting, Constitutionalism or Legal Theory, in: Christian Joerges/Inger-Johanne Sand/Gunther 
Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (2004), 29 et seq. 5 
 
towards an actual realisation of global community interests in international law. At the same 
time, it is not hopelessly optimistic and does not break up public international law’s 
foundation in state consent.
14  This combination of idealism and pragmatism might be 
representative of a German approach.
15 Exponents of the doctrine openly admit that there is 
no coherent constitutional theory of public international law.
16  Despite this caveat, the 
idealist, universalist conception  of public international law, which rests on a long-lasting 
tradition associated with important European public international law scholars, has been 
criticised from different theoretical perspectives for being merely an hegemonic or an 
idealistic projection of the German or European constitutional order.
17
With respect to its perspective vis-à-vis positive law, two approaches can be distinguished in 
the debate. The first one is meant as an analysis of positive international law and stresses 
the emergence of norms which have an objective existence, i.e. independent of the will of 
individual states.
 
18 Constitutionalisation in this sense refers to a notion of autonomy, integrity 
and supremacy of core values of the international legal order. The second approach 
identifies norms of a constitutional character within public international law.
19
                                                           
14 Cp. Bardo Fassbender, The Meaning of International Constitutional Law, in: Macdonald/Johnston (note 
 It observes the 
development of structural norms which are comparable to rights and principles found in 
national constitutions such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 
11), 
837,  846. For an appreciation of Christian Tomuschat’s  approach in particular see: Armin  von Bogdandy, 
Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany, Harv. ILJ 47 (2006), 223, 224 et 
seq.;  Rüdiger Wolfrum, Solidarity amongst States: An Emerging Solidarity Principle of International Law, 
Festschrift Christian Tomuschat (2006), 1087, 1089; for Tomuschat’s self-assessment see id., International Law: 
Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century. General Course on Public International Law, 
RdC 281 (1999), 9, 28. 
15  Stefan  Kadelbach,  Völkerrecht als Verfassungsordnung? Zur Völkerrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland, 
ZaöRV 67/3 (2007), forthcoming. 
16 Fassbender (note 14), 846. 
17 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, EJIL 16 (2005), 113; 
Ulrich Haltern, Tomuschats Traum: Zur Bedeutung von Souveränität im Völkerrecht, Festschrift Christian 
Tomuschat (2006), 867, 867 and 892 et seq. For a recent account of universality and particularity in international 
law see the contributions in: Macdonald/Johnston (note 11), 127 et seq. 
18 Tomuschat, RdC 241 (1993-IV), 195, 216 et seq.; id., International Law as the Constitution of Mankind, in: 
United Nations (ed.), International Law on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century – Views from the International 
Law Commission (1997), 37 et seq.; id., International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a 
New Century, RdC 281 (2001), 9 et seq.; Jochen A. Frowein, Reactions by not Directly Affected States to 
Breaches of Public International Law, RdC 248 (1994-IV), 345, 355 et seq.; id., Konstitutionalisierung des 
Völkerrechts, BDGVR 39 (2000), 427 et seq.;  Bruno  Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in 
International Law, RdC 250 (1994), 6, 221 et seq.; Jost Delbrück, “Laws in the Public Interest”, Festschrift 
Günther Jaenicke (1998), 17 et seq.; id., Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order: 
International Law in the Era of Globalization, SZIER 11 (2001), 1 et seq.; Bardo Fassbender, UN Security 
Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (1998), 89 et seq.; Andreas L. Paulus, Die 
internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht: Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des Völkerrechts im Zeitalter 
der Globalisierung (2001); evaluations by von Bogdandy, Harv. ILJ 47 (2006), 223 et seq.; Pernice (note 10). 
19  Robert Uerpmann, Internationales Verfassungsrecht, Juristenzeitung 56 (2001), 565; Christian Walter, 
Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance, GYIL 44 (2001), 170 et seq.; Bryde, Der Staat 42 (2003), 61 et 
seq.; Harald Steiger, Brauchen wir eine Weltrepublik?, Der Staat 42 (2003), 249; Peters, Leiden JIL 19 (2006), 
579 et seq. 6 
 
Constitutionalisation, accordingly, is rather a process which refers to the legitimacy of public 
international law as such; the need for that process becomes more urgent as more decisions 
taken on the international plane replace or direct political activities at the state level.
20 The 
cluster of topics which are dealt with as “global administrative law” appears to be the natural 
continuance of this debate.
21
 
 
II. The Concept of Constitution  
Theoretically, any reasonably developed legal order can be conceived as having a 
constitution at its disposal, in the sense of a basic norm (constitution in a logical or 
systematic sense) or in terms of what legal theorists call “rules of recognition”,
22 i.e. norms 
which are necessary to bring ordinary law into being and from which it derives its validity, at 
least in a modest version. Public international law presupposes norms about spheres of 
jurisdiction
23  and rules about the formation and change of law.
24  Accordingly, 
constitutionalisation primarily concerns the development of a common public order 
(constitution in a material sense). The distinction Hermann Mosler drew between 
constitutional elements and international public order in his General Course at The Hague 
provided an adequate account of contemporary public international law in times of Cold 
War.
25 In the meantime, the interconnection between the proliferation of public interest norms 
and changes in the procedures of international law-making suggests a comprehensive 
conception of international constitutional law.
26
                                                           
20 Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, EJIL 15 
(2004), 907. 
  Always intended not only to describe the 
present state of the law but also to unfold perspectives for its further consolidation, the 
constitutional approach was able to integrate new developments and build on the creation of 
the League of Nations and of the United Nations.  
21 Benedict Kingsbury/Nico Krisch/Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, Law and 
Contemporary Problems 68 (2005), 15 et seq. 
22 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), 91 et seq.; in terms of the pure theory of law see Hans Kelsen, Reine 
Rechtslehre (2
nd ed. 1961), 324 et seq., with the norm attributing to custom a law-creating character on top of the 
hierarchy of international law. 
23 Alfred Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926), V. 
24 Hermann Mosler, The International Community as a Legal Community, RdC 140 (1974-IV), 1, 32. 
25 Fassbender (note 14), 840. 
26 For a comprehensive conception close to Mosler’s see Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States 
Without or Against Their Will, RdC 241 (1993-IV), 195, 241. 7 
 
A recent study compiled several meanings of international constitutional law.
27 It reveals that 
a concept of constitution which both is capable to grasp recent developments in international 
law and does not ignore enduring realities of international relations must not be too 
demanding. Above all, it should avoid pretending a degree of coherence that does not exist. 
Furthermore, in the absence of real democratic institutions at the international level, the 
concept should not be too ambitious in terms of its level of legitimacy. The multifariousness 
of international law, however, does not exclude the possibility of transferring the concept of 
constitution from states to the international sphere at the outset. State constitutions can also 
be incoherent: They can be laid down in an unorganised mass of different sources, may be 
rather weak compromises or technocratic reform projects or even imposed by colonial 
powers or occupation forces.
28
Still, the guarantee of individual and collective autonomy is a key element of any normative 
concept of a constitution.
 
29 Accordingly, it is essential for the constitutional argument that the 
core principles of international law address all forms of political power.
30  The German 
constitutional lawyer Georg Jellinek meaningfully stated that individual autonomy not only 
means freedom from the law but also freedom through law.
31 According to Hans Kelsen, 
individual autonomy depends on the law.
32 In essence, this takes on the very Kantian idea of 
law.
33  As far as public international law is concerned, this also applies to the collective 
autonomy of individuals united under the constitutions of states and other entities. Hence, the 
advancement of the constitutional idea in international law need not amount to a weakening 
of  the state. A constitutionalised international law should provide better protection of the 
autonomy of states and individuals against unlawful interventions by other states and 
international organisations.
34
                                                           
27 Fassbender (note 
 In addition, respect for the autonomy of those who – like future 
generations  –  cannot decide on their own behalf requires the inclusion of concepts like 
14), 840 et seq. distinguishing the Verdross school, the international community school, the 
New Haven school, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s approach of integrating human rights into the law of the United 
Nations and Jürgen Habermas’ contribution from political philosophy. 
28 Brun-Otto Bryde, International Democratic Constitutionalism, in: Macdonald/Johnston (note 11), 105. 
29 Stefan Kadelbach, Autonomie und Bindung der Rechtsetzung in gestuften Rechtsordnungen, VVDStRL 66 
(2007), 7, 9. 
30 For constitutionalisation as an answer to fragmentation see Helmut Aust/Nina Naske, Rechtsschutz gegen den 
UN-Sicherheitsrat durch europäische Gerichte?, ZÖR 61 (2006), 587, 599 et seq. 
31 Georg Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (2
nd ed. 1905), 95 et seq.; drawing on Jellinek: 
Christoph Möllers, Gewaltengliederung (2005), 41. 
32 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1
st ed. 1934), 43 et seq. 
33 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Erster Teil Metaphyisische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (1797), § 
B. 
34 Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in: Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty 
in Transition (2003), 115, 128 et seq.; Fassbender (note 14), 849. 8 
 
common heritage of mankind in international constitutional law. Accordingly, not every 
increase in regulation equals constitutionalisation.
35
 
 
III. Conditions for International Constitutionalism in German Legal Writings 
In the years after 1945, after the end of national socialist dictatorship and of the period of 
anarchy in which the system of the League of Nations had disintegrated, German national as 
well as international public law had to be rebuilt from the very base. Whereas constitutional 
law scholarship of the Federal Republic was strongly influenced by a long constitutionalist 
tradition that it could draw on, public international law scholarship, to a considerable extent, 
had to reinvent itself. Many German internationalists had been forced into emigration, had 
died during the war or had compromised themselves. Additionally, the new architecture of 
international law, with the U.N. at its centre, the economic re-organisation of Europe and 
Germany’s position in the Cold War obviously provided for topics of a new character. Thus, 
legal writings had very specific needs to serve. 
Supposing there have been, since the war, three phases of legal scholarship to be 
distinguished,
36 it does not come as a surprise that, in the initial phase, writings which dealt 
with general topics were devoted to concepts like sovereignty, recognition, legal personality, 
and the domestic status of international law. In a second cycle from the 60s to the 80s, 
pragmatic needs dominated the agenda, such as the law of international organisations and 
special fields of public international law, with an emphasis on international economic law and 
questions concerning the use of force. The theoretical background was largely neglected and 
left to political sciences without taking much notice of them. It was only in the late 90s, after 
the end of the East-West dichotomy and the recognition of globalisation, that key concepts 
encountered new interest. The widespread belief that states had lost integrative force and 
regulative power raised expectations with respect to the international plane, as formulated by 
the political science concept of global governance.
37 At about the same time, the notions of 
multilevel governance and of multi-level constitutionalism, which were developed with the 
European Union in mind, gained shape,
38
                                                           
35 Cp. Rainer Wahl, Konstitutionalisierung – Leitbegriff oder Allerweltsbegriff?, Festschrift Winfried Brohm 
(2002), 191, 201; Peters, Leiden JIL 19 (2006), 579, 597; Fassbender (note 
  while in international writings on public 
14), 840. 
36 For further reference Kadelbach, ZaöRV 67/3 (2007), forthcoming.  
37  See  Klaus  Dicke, Erscheinungsformen und Wirkungen von Globalisierung in Struktur und Recht des 
internationalen Systems auf universaler und regionaler Ebene sowie gegenläufige Regionalisierungstendenzen, 
BDGVR 39 (2000), 13. 
38 Cf. Markus Jachtenfuchs/Beate Kohler-Koch, Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem, in: id. (eds.), 
Europäische Integration (1996), 30; Fritz W. Scharpf, Regieren in Europa (1999); Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel 9 
 
international law the question of unity and fragmentation had begun to be discussed, not 
least in the context of the juridification of the world trade system.
39
Although the German doctrine is far from having a monopoly on those issues,
 It is in this third period that 
the debate on the constitutionalisation of international law came about.  
40 it is peculiar 
that both aspects of the debate have encountered much interest among German-speaking 
scholars. Most of the current German internationalists take a constitutionalist view of the 
system of international law in that they either stress the autonomy of international law as a 
system which may set limits to political discretion or at least implicitly follow the idealist 
presupposition that progress in the development of international law can be measured by the 
extent to which self-determination, human rights, democracy and the rule of law structure 
international relations. This observation is not to say that other approaches have become 
meaningless; in particular, the textbooks which have been in use for the past decades have 
not yet taken up that trend but rather follow traditional consensus-oriented or legal realist 
theories.
41
One cannot but speculate as to why the constitutionalist perspective has become so 
dominant. The least that can be undertaken is an attempt to explain why there have been 
favourable conditions for that development. Four reasons come to mind which can be traced 
back to long-standing academic traditions. Firstly, German international law follows a 
doctrinal approach, as did Hugo Grotius, which is influenced by Roman civil law; it is a 
method which makes the coherence of a legal system a central argument in legal reasoning 
  However, in current publications on general international law, the change in 
orientation is easy to discern.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited, CML Rev. 36 (1999), 
703. 
39  See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich  Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, EJIL 6 (1995), 161; with respect to the role of WTO in 
the fragmentation debate see International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International law, Report of the Study Group of the ILC 
finalised by Martti Koskenniemi (2006), UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, paras. 165 et seq., 443 et seq. 
40 In his book “The Common Law of Mankind”, published in 1958, Clarence Wilfred Jenks examines the scope 
of international law, the universality of international law and the impact of international organisations on 
international law as the three basic problems of contemporary international law. In the current literature see, e.g., 
Richard Falk et al. (eds.), The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace (1993); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The 
Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, Max Planck UNYB 1 (1997), 1 et seq.; 
John  H. Jackson, Changing Fundamentals of International Law and International Economic Law, AVR 41 
(2003), 435 et seq.; Macdonald/Johnston (note 11); Regis Chemain/Alain Pellet (eds.), La Charte des Nations 
Unies, constitution mondiale? (2006); Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, ICLQ 55 (2006), 51; 
id., The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging 
International Constitutional Order, Leiden JIL 19 (2006), 611.  
41 For a natural law approach based on consensus Alfred Verdross/Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (3
rd 
ed. 1984), § 75; a will-oriented positivist perspective is found in Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht (5
th ed. 2004), § 1 para. 
41 et seq.; close to a Scandinavian version of legal realism is Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Völkerrecht (4
th ed. 
2007), para. I/64; a traditional realist strand is taken by Karl Doehring, Völkerrecht (2
nd ed. 2004), 9 et seq. and 
by Albert Bleckmann, Völkerrecht (2000), 11. 10 
 
and thus sees the law as having an objective existence independent of the will of individual 
judges. Secondly, in Germany, for many reasons, public international law has a strong 
connection with constitutional law. The Old Empire which existed from the Middle Ages until 
1806 was a complicated construction in which legal conflicts between territorial powers 
posed, at the same time, questions of international law. The rulers were seen as bound by 
both natural and international law; the notion of international law as a system of principles, 
rules and institutions presupposed the unity of the law as an underlying idea. The idea of the 
civitas maxima  by Christian Wolff  is but one prominent example.
42  Even today German 
academic international lawyers are still required to qualify to teach constitutional law and 
often publish in that field. Thirdly, federative constructions have been used frequently to 
explain the relationship between German territories as well as between sovereign states. 
Examples are found in the writings of Pufendorf and Kant as well as in Georg Jellinek’s 
concept of international organisations and Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law. Theories of the 
multilevel system which many German scholars adhere to and which are followed in 
particular in models describing European integration are but the natural successors.
43 
Fourthly, many of the classics of German international law theory followed an idealist school 
of thought which is still –  or again –  widely shared in contemporary political and legal 
theory.
44
 
 
C. Constitutional Norms in Public International Law 
Different phenomena have been considered as evidence for a process of 
constitutionalisation. They have their origins in different layers of the geology of international 
law, and legal writings have referred to these norms as being of particular importance at 
different junctures. As will be seen, these ideas are neither new nor German. However, the 
amount of interest these normative structures have found in German legal writings and the 
role attributed to them may be considered as peculiar. In the following sections, each of 
these categories will be analysed separately in order to assess whether they justify a 
constitutionalist reading or if we are rather witnessing a new version of an idealist 
interpretation of positive law.  
                                                           
42 See, for instance, Viktor Bruns, Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, ZaöRV 1 (1929), 1 et seq.; id., Völkerrecht als 
Rechtsordnung, ZaöRV 3 (1932), 445 et seq.; Hermann Mosler, Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, ZaöRV 36 
(1976), 6 et seq.; id., International Society a Legal Community, RdC 140 (1974-IV), 1 et seq.; id., International 
Society as a Legal Community, 1980; Christian Tomuschat, Die internationale Gemeinschaft, AVR 33 (1995), 1. 
43 See Walter Hallstein, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat (1969), 40 et seq.; Pernice, CML Rev. 36 (1999), 703; 
Möllers (note 31), 213, 331; Kadelbach, VVDStRL 66 (2007), 7, 11 et seq. 
44 The writings of Jürgen Habermas are influential, see, for instance, Die postnationale Konstellation (1998), 91 
et seq.; Der gespaltene Westen (2004), 113 et seq.  11 
 
I. Fundamental Norms 
The oldest category cited as constitutional law is what may be summarised as fundamental 
norms.
45  That term comprises the concepts of jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, and 
crimes under international law.
46 The notion is one of minimum morals and can be traced 
back to the humanitarian impulses in 19
th  century international law. Examples are the 
abolition of the slave trade, the first Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law, and the 
Peace Conferences of The Hague.
47 The idea that there are minimum standards of morality 
underlying positive law is reflected by the Martens’ Clause inserted into the preambles of 
various conventions on the laws of war; this clause refers to “principles of the laws of nations, 
as they result from the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of 
humanity, and the dictates of public conscience”.
48 The line is continued by the concept of 
crimes against humanity, first mentioned in the context of incidents during the First World 
War and later taken up in the Charter of Nuremberg.
49 The International Court of Justice 
used language reminiscent of these principles in judgements which refer to “elementary 
considerations of humanity”.
50 The concept of jus cogens attracted interest in parallel cycles, 
starting from private codifications in the 19
th century,
51 taken up in the aftermath of the First 
World War in particular by German-speaking scholars
52 and, finally, again soon after the 
installation of the International Law Commission in one of its first codification projects, the 
law of treaties.
53 Also other public interest norms can be mentioned, like the designation of 
the high seas, outer space and, arguably, Antarctica as common heritage of mankind as well 
as the concept of global commons which refers to the environment and to cultural heritage. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
54
                                                           
45 Cf. Tomuschat, RdC 241 (1993-IV), 195, 216 et seq.; Uerpmann, Juristenzeitung 56 (2001), 565; de Wet, 
ICLQ 55 (2006), 51, 57 et seq.; Fischer-Lescano, ZaöRV 63 (2003), 717, 743 et seq. 
 among whose most active sponsors 
was the German government, marks the most recent step in that development. For a proper 
46 See the contributions in: Christian Tomuschat/Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the 
International Legal Order (2006).  
47 Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (1988), 23 et seq. 
48 See, e.g., preamble, para. 8, of the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of the War on Land, 18 
October 1907, Martens NRGT, sér. 3, tom. 3, 461.  
49 Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, BYIL 23 (1946), 178, 180 et seq. 
50 ICJ, Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania), ICJ Reports 1949, 2, 22; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, 226, para. 79; see also International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The Juno 
Trader Case (St. Vincent and The Grenadines v Guinea Bissau), jgt. of 18 December 2004, ILM 44 (2005), 498, 
512, para. 77. 
51 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (1968), 
paras. 410 et seq.; Pasquale Fiore, Il diritto internazionale codificato e la sua sanzione giuridica (4
th ed. 1909), 
paras. 742, 755. 
52 Alfred Verdross, Règles générales du droit de la paix, RdC 30 (1929-V), 271, 304; Friedrich August v. d. 
Heydte, Die Erscheinungsformen des zwischenstaatlichen Rechts: jus cogens and jus dispositivum im 
Völkerrecht, Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht 16 (1932), 461; Josef Jurt, Zwingendes Völkerrecht (1933). 
53 Further reference in Stefan Kadelbach, Zwingendes Völkerrecht (1992), 36 et seq. 
54 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UNTS 2187, 3.  12 
 
assessment of the question whether jus cogens, erga omnes obligations and crimes under 
international law can be taken as evidence for a constitutionalisation of international law in 
general, it is advisable to recall their respective function and contents.  
Jus cogens, in the first place, is a ground for invalidating international treaties. As is well 
known, according to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
55 a 
treaty is void if it conflicts with peremptory norms of international law. For that purpose, such 
a norm must be recognised by the international community of states as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted. The ability of these norms to overrule bilateral 
consensus entails, as a consequence, that unilateral claims and declarations also cannot be 
valid when in conflict with such norms and that individual states may not consent to the 
violation of such a norm. It appears that the norm-creating character of consent and 
reciprocity is restricted in favour of higher interests. Examples usually given are the 
prohibition of aggression, the crime of genocide and other grave violations of human rights, 
core guarantees of international humanitarian law, the right of self-determination of peoples 
and the protection of the environment from serious, long-term degradation.
56
Shortly after the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties had been opened for signature, 
the International Court of Justice, reluctant to refer to jus cogens, for the first time expressly 
mentioned  erga omnes  obligations in its famous obiter dictum  in the Barcelona Traction 
case.
 
57  Accordingly, these obligations protect interests of the international community of 
states of such a fundamental character that states not directly affected by the responsible 
wrongdoer are also entitled to assert a violation. As a consequence, a situation resulting from 
such misconduct cannot consolidate into an entitlement and may not be recognised as legal 
by third states.
58 Erga omnes obligations are thus a concept of international responsibility of 
states, even though the term is not expressly used in the pertinent ILC articles.
59
Crimes under international law are strictly confined to criminal responsibility of individuals. In 
the narrow sense of the term, they consist of the groups of criminal acts enumerated in the 
 The primary 
norms with erga omnes character are largely identical to jus cogens norms.  
                                                           
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155, 331. 
56 Hannikainen (note 47), 315 et seq. 
57 ICJ, The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 2, para. 
126; see also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, 16, para. 126; Case 
Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 102, para. 29.  
58 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territories, ILM 43 (2004), 
1009, paras. 88, 105 et seq. 
59 Articles on State Responsibility, as taken note of by UN GA Res. 56/83 of 12 December 2001, UN GAOR 56, 
Suppl. No. 10, 29 et seq.; the Articles refer to “obligations owed to the international community as a whole” 
(Article 48).  13 
 
Rome Statute such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and wars of 
aggression. Although the concept of international crimes committed by states was widely 
rejected during the genesis of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility,
60 it is safe to conclude 
that crimes under international law, if they are to be attributed to states, at the same time 
trigger all the consequences of jus cogens and erga omnes norms. However, that conclusion 
does not hold true the other way around.
61
It appears to be logical to place norms which do not allow derogation on a higher level than 
others which do. And if all states are in a position to assert an infringement of erga omnes 
obligations, it sounds convincing that they be allotted a higher rank as well. By the same 
token, the judgement of the ICTY in the Furundzija case states that national law authorising 
or condoning jus cogens violations such as torture has no legal effect.
 
62
 
 Additionally, one 
might argue that any legal order must incorporate minimum guarantees of that kind if it 
intends to bring about a legitimate legal order. Thus, what seems to make the association of 
international law with constitutional law plausible is the construction of a hierarchy of norms 
on the top of which jus cogens and other concepts of the kind stand as well as the necessity 
of these norms for a peaceful social order. On the other hand, the body of fundamental 
norms in primary law can fulfil the functions of constitutional law only to a very limited extent. 
They do not cover the whole range of “rules of recognition”. To some extent, this may indeed 
be said of jus cogens in that it tells us which rules cannot be recognised as valid; however, 
the positive rules of recognition spelled out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice are not considered to belong to the said categories. The status of jus cogens 
and erga omnes norms is not due to their functions as secondary rules, but to the contents of 
the primary rules they contain. Additionally, from a substantive point of view, these primary 
rules display only a small body of essential fundamental rights, a core of international 
morality basically restricted to the prohibition of unjustified large-scale use of force, so that 
they alone would not justify efforts to construe an international constitution out of them. 
                                                           
60 See Marina Spinedi, International Crimes of State: The Legislative History, in: Joseph H.H. Weiler/Antonio 
Cassese/id. (eds.), International Crimes of States: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State 
Responsibility (1989), 7. 
61  Cf.  A.J.J. de Hoogh, The Relationship Between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International 
Crimes, Austrian JIPL 42 (1991), 183; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations 
Erga Omnes, Law and Contemporary Problems 59 (1996), 63 et seq. 
62  International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trials Chamber, Prosecutor v Furundzija, jgt. of 10 
December 1998, reprinted in ILM 38 (1999), 317 para. 155. 14 
 
II. The U.N. Charter and its Article 103 
A second line of argumentation can be derived from the creation of international 
organisations. Whereas  in the 19
th  century, international organisations served a sector-
specific functional purpose, a movement with the objective to place them at the very core of 
international relations began after the founding of the League of Nations. The idealist 
initiative by Woodrow Wilson to make the maintenance of peace and self-determination a 
common concern was the blue-print for the United Nations and the special organisations 
associated with it. Notions of the eras of rationalism and enlightenment influenced that 
perspective.  
From a normativist point of view, but also from the standpoint of other theories, the 
development can be described as a process of constitutionalisation. The U.N., as an 
international organisation to which all states belong, can be seen as the reference point for 
all international law which is either produced or recognised by that organisation. By the 
general consent thus expressed, the U.N. Charter advances to the constitution of the 
international community.
63  International law moves from a primitive legal order towards 
centralisation by instituting authorities with the power to produce and to enforce binding 
rules.
64 At first sight, the Charter also appears to share the character of constitutions in that it 
takes precedence over ordinary law, in this case other treaties, as Article 103 expressly 
states.
65
This approach is subject to criticism from different directions. From a realist standpoint, it can 
be objected that the U.N. does not have at its disposal a monopoly on the use of force in 
order to enforce its law but heavily depends on its member states in that respect. The right to 
veto in the Security Council, in case of conflict, provides for a predominance of national 
interests of some states over the general interests of the state community as a whole. 
Normatively speaking, it is not even clear whether the Charter is to be placed on a higher 
rank than other international obligations. It is subject to some doubt whether Article 103 of 
the Charter has the effect of invalidating conflicting law or whether it is only a rule to resolve 
 
                                                           
63 With respect to the League of Nation see Verdross (note 23), 112; a design of the UN Charter as a world 
constitution is visible in Verdross/Simma  (note  41), paras. 75 et seq.; a new construction is proposed in 
Fassbender (note 18), 89 et seq. For the “intellectual history” and the evolution of the U.N. since 1945 see Paul 
Kennedy, The Parliament of Man (2006). 
64 See Kelsen (note 22), 328; id., Centralisation and Decentralisation, in: Authority and the Individual, Harvard 
Tercentenary Publications (1937), 210 et seq. 
65 As to the League of Nations: Hersch Lauterpacht, The Covenant as the “Higher Law”, BYIL 17 (1936), 54 et 
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conflicts of norms, but leaves the integrity of the treaties in question intact.
66  More 
fundamental is the argument that to interpret the Charter as a constitution is to compare two 
incompatible concepts; it addresses the contents of constitutions on one hand and of the 
Charter on the other. Accordingly, it is neither appropriate to draw a parallel between the 
institutional structure of an international organisation and the branches of powers in a system 
of checks and balances, nor does the Charter contain anything close to a human rights 
catalogue;
67 as the discussion on targeted sanctions and their judicial review reveals, it is not 
even beyond doubt that the U.N. institutions regard themselves to be bound by human 
rights.
68
 
  Rules in the Charter which aim at the use of powers and its limits are at best 
fragmentary. Finally, U.N. law is not an autonomous legal order in the sense that it is able to 
define by its own terms the conditions of its validity and enforcement. Most  of the U.N. 
resolutions are not binding, most of the binding U.N. law has to be transformed or adopted, 
as the case may be, into the legal orders of the member states, and there is no mandatory 
dispute settlement before a judiciary with the power to review. Thus, the contention that the 
Charter embodies the constitution of mankind does not appear to be intuitively plausible.  
III. Constitutional Law of International Organisations 
Even though attributing to the Charter a constitutional character would carry the point too far, 
international institutional law can be relevant for the present discussion in four respects. 
Firstly, the founding treaties of international organisations, often officially christened 
“constitution”, might be regarded as reference documents for a specialised legal order in a 
world of fragmented subsystems of international law.
69
                                                           
66 In the latter sense: Verdross/Simma (note 
  The objectives and principles of 
United Nations law, by virtue of its ties to other international organisations (Articles 57 to 60, 
63, 64, 66 UNC) and its supremacy in case of conflicts with other treaties (Article 103 UNC), 
might be seen as a framework legal order, an umbrella under which constitutionalised 
41), para. 641; for further reference to the debate see R. Bernhardt, 
Article 103, in: Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations (2002), paras. 15 et seq.; International 
Law Commission (note 39), paras. 328 et seq. 
67 Andreas L. Paulus, From territoriality to functionality? Towards a legal methodology of globalization, in: Ige 
F. Dekker/Wouter G. Werner (eds.), Governance and International Legal Theory (2004), 59, 63 et seq.; C. 
Walter, International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization, in: André Nollkämper/Janne E. Nijman (eds.), 
New Perspectives on the Divide Between International Law and National Law (2007), forthcoming. 
68 Valérie Bore Eveneo, Le contrôle juridictionnel des résolutions du conseil de sécurité, R.G.D.I.P. 2006, 827; 
Mehrdad Payandeh, Rechtskontrolle des UN-Sicherheitsrates durch staatliche und überstaatliche Gerichte, 
ZaöRV 66 (2006), 41. 
69 See, e.g., Constitution of the International Labour Organization, 11 April 1919, as amended 9 October 1946, 
UNTS 15, 40 and UNTS 191, 143; Constitution of the Food and Agricultural Organisation, 16 October 1945, 
YUN 1946-47, 693; Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 16 
November 1945, UNTS 4, 275; with respect to legal questions as such of a constitutional character see Clarence 
Wilfred Jenks, Some Constitutional Problems of International Organisations, BYIL 22 (1945), 11. 16 
 
subsystems develop. This would be an expression of a reduced concept of centralisation, in 
the sense that such subsystems would be restricted to particular or regional communities of 
international law.
70 The European Union might serve as an example. Secondly, the legal 
orders brought about by specialised or regional international organisations may be reflective 
of, or influenced by, constitutional norms such as democracy, human rights or the rule of law. 
Again, the European Union, as well as arguably the World Trade Organization, comes to 
mind. Thirdly, some international organisations are the product of initiatives which have their 
origin not, or at least not exclusively, in diplomacy, but in society; in their law-making 
activities they thus express demands which immediately follow from group interests or simply 
notions of a minimum morality in international relations; the International Labour Organization 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross are examples of this type. Fourthly, 
organisations may themselves be promoters of constitutional principles, such as, e.g., the 
Council of Europe,
71
 
 and thus contribute to a process of constitutionalisation. In the following 
sections, four organisations are selected, which in one way or another can be taken as 
evidence for such a development. As will be seen, in some of them, the nucleus for the 
emergence of constitutional ideas was laid long ago. 
1. The European Union 
Long before the project of a treaty on a Constitution for Europe
72  was launched, court 
decisions and legal writings referred to the founding treaties of the European Community as 
a constitution. The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) did so as early as 1967, the 
European Court of Justice in 1986.
73  It is a complex set of reasons which justifies that 
contention. The European Court of Justice step-by-step had established Community Law as 
an autonomous legal order in the sense that its institutions are empowered to enact law, that 
its judiciary is equipped with the power of legal review, that it takes priority over municipal law 
and that it confers rights and obligations upon individuals.
74
                                                           
70 Kelsen (note 
 As a complement to supremacy 
and direct effect, the ECJ developed fundamental rights as legal principles out of the 
common constitutional traditions and common international law obligations of the member 
22), 328. 
71 See preamble and Articles 1 and 3 Statute of the Council of Europe, 5 May 1949, UNTS 87, 103.  
72 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 29 October 2004, OJ No. C 310, 1.  
73 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vol. 22, 193, 296; ECJ, Case 294/83, Parti écologiste „Les 
Verts“ v European Parliament, 1986 ECR 1339 para. 23; see also Hans Peter Ipsen, Europäische Verfassung – 
nationale Verfassung, EuR 1987, 195; as to the ambiguity of the term “constitution” in that context: Trevor 
Clayton Hartley, International Law and the Law of the European Union – A Reassessment, BYIL 72 (2001), 1, 3 
et seq. 
74 ECJ, Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos, 1963 ECR 1, 12; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 ECR 585, 593.  17 
 
states such as, above all, the European Convention on Human Rights.
75 Further decisions, 
by taking up the rule of law and democracy, continued that constitutionalisation by judge-
made law.
76 Following the emergence of a judicial constitution, initiatives to start a political 
process with a view to the constitutionalisation of Europe introduced several drafts of a 
European Constitution, gradually enhanced the involvement of the European Parliament in 
the law-making procedure, inserted provisions on Union citizenship into the EC Treaty 
(Articles 17 to 21 EC) and, finally, in the follow-up to the Nice Conference in 2000, drafted 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional Treaty.
77
Parallel to that process, a change in the prevailing opinion in Germany with respect to the 
possibility of constitutional law beyond the domestic context took place. Until the end of the 
90s, the majority of German constitutional lawyers took the view that constitutions are 
necessarily linked to the concept of a nation state,
 Additionally, the Union, in 
its external relations, has declared the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law to be one of its objectives, in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Article 11 EU) as 
well as in the co-operation with developing countries (Article 177 EC).  
78 basically for two reasons. The first was 
that the German idea of the rule of law depends on a separation between monarch and state; 
the act which ties the powers of the monarchical executive to the law is embodied in the 
constitution.
79  The second argument is derived from the democratic principle: a political 
discourse in which the will of the people is channelled, accordingly, cannot take place but in 
an arena where public opinion has a direct bearing on voting behaviour, which is not possible 
beyond state borders.
80
                                                           
75 ECJ, Case 29/69, Stauder, 1969 ECR 419; Case 4/73, Nold, 1974 ECR 491; Case 44/79, Hauer, 1979 ECR 
3727.  
 Behind both arguments, more or less explicitly, is the notion of a 
people that consists of the parties to the social contract and that is the author of all 
emanations of the will of a commonwealth. Under the influence of European 
76  As to democracy:  ECJ,  Case 138/79, Roquette Frères, 1980 ECR 3333; Case C-300/89,  Commission v. 
Germany, 1991 ECR I-2867 para. 20; with respect to the rule of law: ECJ, Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les 
Verts” v European Parliament, 1986 ECR 1339 para. 23. 
77  As to the constitutional process in the European Union:  Ingolf Pernice, Europäisches und nationales 
Verfassungsrecht, VVDStRL 60 (2000), 148, 165 et seq.;  Armin von  Bogdandy, Konstitutionalisierung des 
europäischen öffentlichen Rechts in der europäischen Republik, Juristenzeitung 60 (2005), 529; as to the travaux 
préparatoires of the Constitutional Treaty: Hans-Georg Dederer, Die Konstitutionalisierung Europas, Zeitschrift 
für Gesetzgebung 18 (2003), 97;  Daniel  Göler, Die Europäische Union vor ihrer Konstitutionalisierung, 
integration 26 (2003), 17. 
78 See, for instance, Josef Isensee, Staat und Verfassung, in: id./P. Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, 
vol. I (2nd ed. 1995), § 13 paras. 1 and 8; Paul Kirchhof, Die Identität der Verfassung in ihren unabänderlichen 
Inhalten, in: id. § 19 para. 18; Dieter Grimm, Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?, Juristenzeitung 50 (1995), 581, 
590 et seq.; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Nation, Europa (1999), 135 et seq. 
79  Cf.  Thomas  Vesting, Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes: Konsequenzen von 
Europäisierung und Internationalisierung, VVDStRL 63 (2004), 41. 
80  Stefan  Korioth, Europäische und nationale Identität: Integration durch Verfassungsrecht?,  VVDStRL 62 
(2003), 117, 150 et seq. 18 
 
constitutionalism, this view appears to have lost some of its impact. Complementarily, the 
model of a multilevel constitution, in which powers are shared between the peoples of 
Europe on the Union level and the nation state constituencies at state level, has gained 
influence.
81
The theory of multi-level constitutionalism resting on the assumption of shared competencies 
does not depend on the political success of the Constitutional Treaty. The political failure of 
the constitutional project, however, reminds us that the concept of a constitution used here 
can only be one of legal theory. In a formal sense as well as with respect to typical contents 
of a constitution, this model appears to be plausible. Interestingly, the federal paradigm is 
often expressly referred to in the German debate.
 
82
The question is which conclusions can be drawn for the hypothesis of constitutionalisation of 
international law. Certainly, the European Union and the Council of Europe have contributed 
to the constitutionalisation of Europe in the sense that the constitutional norms they adopted 
and promoted now also form part of regional international law;
 
83  furthermore, they have 
played a role in the process of converting dictatorships and post-communist societies into 
constitutional states, and the ambition is to play this role also outside of Europe. At the end of 
the day, however, it does not prove much more than that constitutionalisation is an 
appropriate term to describe a development from an intergovernmental type of decision-
making towards a law-based organisation with its own system of checks and balances, 
accountability and human rights. At the universal level, it is one, and probably the most 
elaborate, example of a non-state constitutional organisation within a complex system of 
state and post-state constitutional polities and processes.
84
 
 However, it has influenced the 
debate on the legitimacy of international organisations and their decisions. 
                                                           
81 Note 38; cf. also Anne Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (2001), 183 et seq.; Thomas 
Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen Konstitutionalisierungsprozess 
(2003), 311 et seq., 730 et seq.; Stefan Oeter, Federalism and Democracy, in: Armin von Bogdandy/Jürgen Bast 
(eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2005), 53 et seq. 
82 Hallstein (note 44); Peters, Giegerich and Oeter (note 81); see also Daniel Thürer, Der Verfassungsstaat als 
Glied einer europäischen Gemeinschaft, VVDStRL 53 (1991), 97, 131 et seq.;  Armin  von  Bogdandy, 
Supranationaler Föderalismus als Wirklichkeit und Idee einer neuen Herrschaftsform (1999), 61 et seq.; 
Kadelbach, VVDStRL 66 (2006), 7, 10 et seq. 
83 Cf. Francis Snyder, General Course on Constitutional Law of the European Union, AEL VI/1 (1995), 41, 99 et 
seq.;  Joseph  H.H. Weiler, Introduction: The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, in: id.  (ed.), The 
Constitution of Europe (1997), 221; Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (1999), 123 et seq.; for the 
German debate see Stefan Oeter, Europäische Integration als Konstitutionalisierungsprozess, ZaöRV 59 (1999), 
901; Christian Walter, Die EMRK als Konstitutionalisierungsprozess, ZaöRV 59 (1999), 961 et seq.; Giegerich 
(note81).  
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2. The World Trade Organization 
It is above all the WTO which has been frequently tested against the European Union 
constitutional model.
85 Some phenomena, indeed, seem to justify such a parallel.
86 Liberal 
international economic rules may be understood as constitutional rules in the sense of long-
term rules constraining the short-term self-interests of both private individuals and 
government officials.
87  The compulsory dispute settlement system which produces 
enforceable decisions by a quasi-supranational procedure, the negative consensus principle, 
may be seen as having the potential to establish the rule of law. The internal priority of treaty 
law over derived legislation constitutes an internal hierarchy of norms. The law-making power 
of bodies such as the codex alimentarius Commission, which in some areas in effect replace 
domestic legislation with international standards, has opened a debate on the democratic 
deficit of the WTO.
88
 
 The WTO is confronted with the demand to enhance its legitimacy by 
integrating, among other so-called non-trade-issues, human rights into its legal order. The 
state of affairs thus sketched out already indicates that constitutionalisation is one prospect 
for the future structure of WTO but not a description of its current situation; the WTO is 
presently undergoing a process of juridification, rather than one of a constitutionalisation. 
What follows, however, is that the standards by which such an organisation is measured 
have changed, and that the criteria used are taken from constitutional law.  
3. The Role of NGOs – and the ICRC and ILO as Two Organisations Neglected in the 
Debate 
So far, we have dealt with organisations which are either said to form a constitutional system 
or to be influenced by constitutional principles. These examples – and their interpretation – 
are particularly illustrative of the first phase of the debate which circled around constitutional 
norms within international law. In the second phase, it was suggested, demands were 
formulated which address the legitimacy of the use of power by actors on the international 
plane, i.e. in particular international organisations with law-making capacity. In that respect, 
                                                           
85 Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European Community Law, 
EJIL 3 (1992), 1 et seq.; Cottier/Hertig (note 10), 272. For an account of the different ideas associated with 
constituionalism in the world trading system see Deborah Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization (2005): 
86 See, with respect to the following list, Meinhard Hilf and Wolfgang Benedek, Die Konstitutionalisierung der 
Welthandelsordnung, BDGVR 40 (2003), 257 et seq. and 283, 301 et seq., respectively. 
87 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic 
Law (1991), 212. 
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many legal writings attribute an important role to NGOs, as organisations of civil society.
89 
Their participation is expected to enhance the legitimacy of the decisions taken, and 
suggestions are made to improve, or at least to channel, their influence in the law-making 
process. Keywords which are used in the same context are good governance, accountability, 
and transparency.
90
Law-making initiatives of organised civil society at least are neither uncommon nor entirely 
new in international law. The example of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) tells us that a private initiative can result in the working-out of an international 
convention, the first Geneva Convention of 1864,
 
91
The other organisation to be mentioned is the International Labour Organization (ILO), a 
result of the 19
th century’s social conflicts and a model for corporatist decision-making. The 
constitutional character of this organisation, as with the ILO in general, is widely neglected in 
German legal writings.
 that governments do not have a natural 
monopoly on improving standards in international law, and that even the surveillance of the 
implementation, to a considerable extent, can be entrusted to an NGO. Additionally, the 
example also shows that the roots of the contemporary constitutional debate are found in the 
19
th century, in the era of the emancipation of the citizen and of the creation of the modern 
constitutional state.  
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  Wrongly so, for it provides for some phenomena which would 
deserve further attention in the debate. Its structure is tripartite in the sense that state 
delegates as well as members of workers and employers organisations are represented in its 
institutions, the International Labour Conference, to which the founders attributed the 
character of a world parliament, and the Governing Body. Half of the members of each of 
these institutions are sent by the member states, and workers and employers constitute the 
other half on an equal footing (Article 3 (1) ILO Constitution). Thus, organised fractions of 
90  See  Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond  the State: Transnational Democracy and/or 
Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, Ind.J.Global Legal Studies 10 (2003), 29; Kumm, EJIL 15 (2004), 907; 
Karl-Peter Sommermann, Demokratie als Herausforderung des Völkerrechts, Festschrift Christian Tomuschat 
(2006), 1051. 
91 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 22 August 
1864, Parry CTS, Vol. 129, 361.  
92 But see Möllers (note 31), 287 et seq. who undertakes an analysis of the organisation with respect to its system 
of checks and balances; see generally Ebere Osieke, Constitutional Law and Practice in the International Labour 
Organisation (1985); Francis Maupain, L’OIT, la justice sociale et la mondialisation, RdC 278 (1999), 201; 
Isabelle Duplessis, Le recours à la constitution de l’OIT dans l’acquisition de son autonomie instutionnelle, 
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civil society participate not only in the negotiating process of ILO Conventions and 
resolutions, but also cast their votes on the final texts which are adopted by a two-thirds 
majority. According to Article 19 (5) of the ILO Constitution, the final text of a convention is to 
be brought before “the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies”; the 
provision is understood as ensuring public debate.
93 The ratification process follows the rules 
which apply to all treaties. As a consequence of the tripartite structure, however, there are 
some peculiar features: Reservations not expressly provided for in the conventions opened 
for signature by the ILO are not permitted since they lack consent of the trade unions and 
employers.
94 The latest Instrument of Amendment to the ILO Constitution, dating from 1997 
and not yet in force, also reflects the strong position of the ILO with its tripartite constitutional 
structure towards the member states.
95 It provides for a new paragraph 9 to article 19 of the 
ILO Constitution which authorises the International Labour Conference, by a majority of two-
thirds of the votes cast by the delegates present, to abrogate any Convention if it appears 
that the Convention has lost its purpose or that it no longer makes a useful contribution to 
attaining the objectives of the organisation. The careful consideration of the effects of such 
abrogation reflects the fact that the new mechanism delicately touches upon the position of 
member states: It is intended that an abrogated Convention ceases to be an ILO Convention, 
while those member states that have ratified it and which might oppose its abrogation shall 
not be prevented from considering themselves still bound inter se by its provisions. But they 
may no longer call on the ILO to supervise observance and maintain the procedural 
obligations in respect of Conventions which no longer serve its objectives.
96 Finally, unions 
and associations also participate in the surveillance of labour standards and have a right to 
submit a representation or a complaint against states which fail to comply (Articles 24 and 26 
ILO Constitution).
97
The ILO thus resembles three characteristics of a constitutionalised subsystem. First, it has 
its own internal hierarchy of norms between the ILO Constitution, the ILO Conventions and, 
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finally, soft-law such as resolutions and other acts of the kind. Second, the ILO works with 
the participation of NGOs on an institutionalised basis, so that it may claim to have 
incorporated a procedure of co-operation with interested groups and to have established a 
special standard of legitimacy. Thirdly, the ILO is value-oriented in the sense that it itself 
promotes constitutional principles such as human rights and the participation of associations 
in the working-out of labour standards within the member states.  
 
IV. Constitutionalism as a Response to Restrictions on the Domaine Réservé of States 
As we have seen, constitutionalisation can be seen as a response to demands for legitimacy 
of international law. In this context, international constitutional norms serve a function which 
can be compared to functions of state constitutions. In legal systems governed by the rule of 
law, intrusions into fundamental rights of the individual or into the autonomy of self-governing 
bodies in a federation or in a regionalist system have to be justified on legal grounds as 
usually spelled out in the constitution. Likewise it can be argued that the demand for 
constitutional law at the international level increases as more decisions taken by international 
organisations take effect on the domestic plane.  
Examples are not difficult to find. In the first place, regional organisations of economic 
integration have to be mentioned. These have developed on all continents with the European 
Union serving as blue-print. Many of them are only at their beginning, others may be 
stagnating; inasmuch, the design usually is to reduce customs and other barriers to trade 
gradually and to harmonise economic law. As to the European Union, its development 
politics makes support dependent on the observance of human rights and minimum criteria 
of democracy. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank’s policies of 
conditionality require reforms in the internal economic structures of states to which they 
agree on a bilateral basis.
98 Other specialised organisations produce decisions which in one 
way or another replace domestic law. The example of the WTO has already been mentioned. 
Similarly, the International Telecommunications Union produces technical standards which 
member states or private enterprises are expected to apply, often without their having been 
formally transposed by parliamentary assent.
99
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registers intellectual property rights which the member states are bound to enforce, 
depending on the respective protection system applicable.  
If tendencies to introduce standards of good governance, human rights protection and 
accountability continue, a system of a plurality of quasi-constitutional subsystems with their 
own internal hierarchies of norms might emerge. The development may be interpreted as a 
response to nation states’ losses of influence and as a construction complementary to the 
states’ legal orders, establishing a multilayer and multifaceted landscape of different entities 
with different powers to pursue public interests.
100
 
 It is only this context in which the term 
‘constitutionalisation’ gains a genuine meaning and marks a new development in public 
international law.  
V. Interim Conclusions 
Structures in positive law which authors point at when writing about constitutionalisation are 
heterogeneous. The background understanding of those who thus argue is different as well, 
since there are different discussions which unfold contemporaneously. As far as fundamental 
norms are concerned, their origins are much older than their re-interpretation as 
constitutional norms. Their existence and effects do not depend on such attributions; on the 
contrary, the constitutional debate might even induce a catchword-like use of the concepts of 
jus cogens, erga omnes obligations and other public interest norms – an overuse which is 
likely to obscure their genuine meaning. The best that can be said about the link between 
these principles and international constitutionalism is that they symbolise a core morality of 
international relations without which no legal community can exist.  
The second layer of norms of an arguably constitutional character stems from international 
institutional law and the underlying aspirations to build the fundaments of a new international 
order. In history, this process had two phases, each one starting respectively after the World 
Wars. Constitutional theorists who would assert that they form the nucleus of a centralised 
international legal system are rare, although at first glance it may be tempting to construct a 
normative theory of law on this basis. However, as especially the example of the ILO shows, 
some legal structures which today would be called constitutional have already developed 
within international organisations. The third and most current development law is 
characterised by demands and attempts to build constitutional principles into the structures 
of international organisations and to make them guidelines for their decision-making, 
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internally as well as with respect to individual states. In essence, it is this phenomenon 
which, probably influenced by the European constitutional debate, is taken as evidence of a 
constitutionalisation in terms of the function and substance of constitutional law. This 
phenomenon thus forms the essence of various constitutionalisation theses. The 
consequences of globalisation include the general impression of dwindling state influence 
and a complementary increase in both the powers of international institutions and the amount 
of collective decision-making by groups of states without meaningful concepts of democratic 
participation. These and similar consequences have triggered a demand for constitutional 
structures which bind authorities who act on the international plane. Understood in this way, 
international constitutionalism is, to some extent, certainly a neo-idealist reconstruction of 
existing law; constitutional structures, accordingly, may not precisely govern the relationship 
between different norms, but rather express an invisible design behind international law 
which in some instances reaches out in the form of binding norms. Thus, international 
constitutionalism is a normative expectation against which the actions of nations and 
organisations can be measured. In the following section, an attempt will be made to fit the 
phenomena found in international law and their suggested constitutional meaning into the 
system of sources of public international law and to find a plausible explanation for them in 
legal theory.  
 
D. Constitutional Norms as Principles 
I. The Constitutional Approach to Public International Law as a Value-oriented 
Approach 
1. Values in German Public International Law Scholarship and Constitutional Doctrine 
One possible linkage between the discourses on national and international constitutions and 
constitutionalism is the emergence of international constitutional values as a compensation 
for an ongoing de-constitutionalisation on the domestic level in times of globalisation.
101 
Indeed, constitutional approaches to public international law tend to rely on values.
102
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Varying in terminology, some contributions from Germany speak of public interest or 
community interest norms about democracy, human rights, the rule of law, protection of the 
environment, or protection of the individual as core elements of international 
102 For the foundation of public international law in basic values see Alfred Verdross, Die Wertgrundlagen des 
Völkerrechts, AVR 4 (1953), 129. 25 
 
constitutionalisation,
103 whilst others prefer the term ‘values’.
104 Some authors can identify at 
least some universal values within international law
105 or a core value system common to all 
communities.
106 Constitutionalisation has been rephrased as the emergence of an “objective 
value order”.
107 In most of these contributions, the identification of values in international law 
is intended to be a descriptive statement about the law and has, above all, a symbolic 
meaning. A more demanding conception seeks values enshrined in the law, particularly the 
U.N. Charter and jus cogens, to provide the necessary “glue” in a fragmented international 
order
108 or offer guidelines for the interpretation of legal regimes.
109 Sometimes, common 
values are understood to provide the basis for the deduction of rules of customary 
international law.
110 With respect to terminology, it has been argued that ‘value’ is a more 
appropriate term because it recognises the subjective or rather normative side of public 
interests. Accordingly, despite their strong ethical underpinning, values should be based on 
actual international consensus.
111
Value-orientation is not an exclusive trait of the constitutional approach to public international 
law. First and foremost, it is to be associated with the New Haven approach. In this “policy 
oriented” school, values denote psychological preferences or elementary political 
conceptions. International law as a “global process of authoritative decision” aims at the 
realisation of such public order goals. They are used to describe and analyse situations and 
to provide criteria for the decision of concrete cases and for the interpretation of international 
law. Furthermore, they are the yardstick for the appraisal of the legal system in terms of 
 The term ‘public interests’, by contrast, presupposes at 
least a certain degree of objectivity. 
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goals.
112 The main difference to the conception of values in the constitutional approach is 
that the New Haven approach dismisses the distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda and 
attaches little value to the stabilizing function of international law. The constitutional 
approach, by contrast, relies on the limitative function of values.
113
The initial position of national constitutions to effect integration on the basis of represented 
common values is stronger than in international law. With regard to a state constitution, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and scholarship have conceptualized the basic 
rights of the German Basic Law as “values” which provide the basis of an “objective value 
order”.
 
114 A famous decision in this context is the Lüth judgement of 1958.
115 Later, the court 
referred to the objective legal content of basic rights and to the creation of a constitutional 
value.
116 The values contained in that order are to provide information on how to balance 
legally protected interests.
117 Yet, it must be noted that this value order only expresses the 
normative content of basic rights and simply rephrases the content of constitutional norms.
118 
This is exactly the reason why some prefer the term ‘values’ for public international law. 
Beyond questions of terminology, the FCC definitely has transformed the basic rights of 
classical liberal provenance into general value programmes. The doctrine of constitutional 
rights as objective basic norms is a particular feature of German jurisprudence and 
scholarship.
119 Everywhere else, especially in philosophy, value concepts have gone out of 
fashion.
120
                                                           
112  Sandra Voos, Die Schule von New Haven (2000), 98 et seq. with references. See  e.g.  Myres S. 
McDougal/Harold D. Laswell/Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order (1980). 
 Furthermore, the adaptation of value-ethics as a moral concept to law causes 
113  Tomuschat, RdC 281 (1999), 9, 25 et seq.;  Daniel Khan/Andreas Paulus, Gemeinsame Werte in der 
Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, in: Ingo Erberich et al. (eds.), Frieden und Recht (1998), 217, 224 et seq. 
114 See e.g. the case law of the FCC listed in Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002), 14 et seq., 
in particular BVerfGE 7, 198, 205 – Lüth, and as the latest decision BVerfGE 62, 323, 329. 
115 See Thomas Henne/Arne Riedlinger (ed.), Das Lüth-Urteil aus (rechts-)historischer Sicht (2005). 
116  BVerfGE 49, 89, 141 et seq.  –  Kalkar; BVerfGE 53,  30, 57 –  Mühlheim-Kärlich. Cf. Ralf Dreier, 
Konstitutionalismus und Legalismus: Zwei Arten juristischen Diskurses im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat, 
Festschrift Werner Maihofer (1988), 87. On the effects of an ethical globalisation on this “objective value order” 
see Stefan Kadelbach, Ethik des Völkerrechts unter Bedingungen der Globalisierung, ZaöRV 64 (2004), 1, 6 et 
seq. 
117 Cp. Udo Di Fabio, Zur Theorie eines grundrechtlichen Wertesystems, in: Detlef Merten/Hans-Jürgen Papier 
(eds.), Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa, § 46 subs. 5. 
118 Hesse, in: id., para. 299; Friedhelm Hufen, Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte (2007), 12 et seq. 
119  Hans D. Jarass, Die Grundrechte: Abwehrrechte und objektive Grundsatznormen, Festschrift  50 Jahre 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Vol. 2: Klärung und Fortbildung des Verfassungsrechts  (2001), 35, 36. For the 
objective-value approach as a basis for the duty to protect see Dieter Grimm, The protective function of the state, 
in: Georg Nolte (ed.), European and US Constitutionalism (2005), 137, 143 et seq. 
120 Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System (2004), 121. For a survey of the strands of value thinking in 
philosophy see Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Zur Kritik der Wertbegründung des Rechts, in: id., Recht, Staat, 
Freiheit (extended ed. 2006), 67, 71 et seq.: neo-Kantian subjective value thinking, objective value thinking 
(Wertphilosophie – Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann), life-world orientation (Wilhelm Dilthey, Theodor Litt, 
Eudard Spranger). 27 
 
severe problems.
121 The antagonism between value relativism and attachment to values has 
important roots in the famous Methodenstreit between positivists and anti-positivists in the 
German constitutional doctrine of the Weimar Republic.
122 In that debate,
123 some strands of 
the anti-positivist conception of constitutional law relied on value judgements.
124 By contrast, 
Hans Kelsen, an important German-speaking exponent of pre-war international 
constitutionalism,
125
 
 is firmly indebted to positivism.  
2. Deficits of the Value Approach  
The reliance on values in constitutional doctrine can possibly be understood as recourse to 
natural law or to a philosophy of values. Arguably, it is a topos of a legal terminology. As 
such, it has been criticised both for its self-referentiality as well as for its departure from the 
text of the constitution. The first aspect is prominently formulated by Luhmann’s general 
systems theory. Value concepts provide the potential to obtain legitimacy whilst, at the same 
time, keeping options open where decisions over conflicts of values are concerned. As the 
constitution does not contain rules for conflicts between values, it requires a functioning legal 
system for the treatment of such conflicts. Consequently, the law refers in everything it says 
to itself. All references to values, whether ordinary ones or ‘higher’ ones, are used only as 
formulations in decision-making and hardly exhaust the full potential of internal rationality 
provided by the functional differentiation of systems.
126  The second criticism comes 
particularly from textualism and originalism in U.S. constitutional theory.
127  It is directed 
against culture value theories, which rely on extrinsic sources like moral consensus and 
natural law. Less firmly rooted in a particular theory or world-view are the criticisms warning 
against elitist autosuggestion in a pluralistic society
128
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 and methodological deficits. Subjective 
valuations may lie hidden behind apparently objective value-based reasoning, which may 
122 Di Fabio, HGrR II, § 44, subs. 2. 
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lead to a loss of rationality and certainty in the law.
129 The quintessence of the critique has 
also been formulated by Robert Alexy: Values do not provide the basis for a rational legal 
argumentation aiming at the highest possible degree of inter-subjective control.
130
Similarly, the conception of public international law on the basis of values has been subject 
to criticism. The critics focus on the arbitrary character of a legal technique that relies on 
universal values.
 
131 Below the surface of universal law, a hegemonic struggle of material 
positions is deemed to take place.
132 At best, public international law can serve as a formal 
surface for the exchange of legal arguments. Hence, so the critics say, the function – and the 
proprium – of law is limited to its formalism. As far as contents and concrete answers to the 
“real” problems of the world are concerned, international law is regarded as flawed by its 
fundamental indeterminacy.
133  The U.N. Charter, which is an important element of 
constitutional conceptions of public international law, has been criticised for being merely the 
groundwork of an international “oligarchy of oligarchies”.
134
But the wide range of criticism reaches far beyond its domestic counterpart. Some doubt 
whether international law-making can even address values and whether a community can be 
constituted under international law at all, as it lacks the symbolic-aesthetic dimension 
inherent to national constitutional law.
  So far, the criticism seems 
somehow to echo and amplify the domestic debate. 
135  In addition, one important difference to national 
constitutional law exists, inasmuch as national constitutional courts decide on value conflicts. 
By contrast, a possible consensus on values in international law is not reflected  in a 
consensus on an adequate framework of international institutions guarding those values. 
Essentially, the community interest rests on a “bilateralist grounding”. Conflicts of values 
raise questions of coordination between different institutions and questions of balancing 
classical against community values or balancing competing community values.
136
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ensuing obligations and responsibilities have yet to be developed.
137
 
 Recent developments in 
institution-building rather favour specialised organisations and therefore thwart the project of 
creating guardians of the common interests which could decide on conflicts between 
universal values. One example where values are actually linked to a special institution is 
international criminal law: The establishment of the ad hoc international tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and  Rwanda as well as the conclusion of the Rome Statute for a 
permanent International Criminal Court reinforce the understanding that the international 
community protects certain humanitarian values by imposing individual criminal 
responsibility. 
II. Hierarchy of Values 
Values are taken to be enshrined in the fundamental norms of public international law which 
are hierarchically superior to other norms,
138 whereas ordinary rules may enjoy priority of 
application as lex specialis.
139  It is submitted that the extent of relative normativity in 
international law is overstated by some ideal conceptions as well as by some critics, who 
want to provide the basis for a deconstruction of the argument. In an ideally 
constitutionalised world, the hierarchy of values would be reflected in a strictly hierarchical 
order of rules and values. Here, the protection of international peace and security is 
paramount over state sovereignty, whereas human rights and the prohibition of the use of 
force take precedence over free trade. This kind of inherent order in the law supposedly 
guarantees legal certainty.
140  At the reverse end of the spectrum, it has been doubted 
whether, in the light of the self-referentiality and the resulting indeterminacy of public 
international law, it could be possible to maintain any consistent hierarchical relationship 
within the law.
141  Like the acceptance of values as such, the agreement that some 
substantive norms are hierarchically superior is deemed to necessarily depend on the 
absence of an institutional link with those norms as well as on their open-endedness, which 
allows all actors to project their preferences onto the broad formulations.
142
Admittedly, relative normativity in international law is not so well-ordered as some idealized 
conceptions suggest. There are multiple normative hierarchies. Jus cogens and soft law can 
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be seen as the upper and lower extremes of the hierarchical order.
143 In-between, there are 
many levels of ‘relative normativity’, which rely on the formal attributes of norms. Some 
provisions of a treaty may be non-derogable, and treaty reservations touching upon them 
might be inadmissible.
144 Amongst derogable norms, one can differentiate between those 
norms which are guaranteed without limitations, or clawbacks, and others which are subject 
to limitation clauses. Furthermore, there might be a hierarchy among treaties governing the 
same topic or among regimes established by specific choice-of-law provisions and claims of 
primacy.
145 Besides this diversity of norms with distinctive formal attributes, one can certainly 
try to qualify them according to their normative weight. But it should be clear at the outset 
that the reliance on hierarchies in the law which are both concrete and substantive is 
foredoomed. Even for domestic legal systems, strict hierarchies of norms and values are, 
though theoretically conceivable, fairly improbable.
146 They are fixed once and for all and are, 
hence, static and inflexible.
147 In the international order, such a hierarchy of concrete rules 
based on the consent of states is hardly achievable. In any case, the reliance on hierarchies, 
such as the higher rank of jus cogens or a constitutional reading of the U.N. Charter, will not 
suffice and does not provide solutions in each and every value conflict.
148
 
  
III. Reconstruction of the Constitutional Approach as a Theory of Constitutional 
Principles 
Still, a constitutionalist approach based on public interest norms with a moral content need 
not be without avail. It is submitted that it can be defended if constitutional norms are 
established as principles. We will use the term ‘principle’ with reference to sources (‘general 
principles of international law’) as well as to legal argumentation. In legal argumentation, 
statements of principle are structurally equivalent to statements of value.
149
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  Relying on 
principles, the complexity of hierarchies needed to solve cases of conflict can be reduced 
significantly. Whilst for some, a hierarchy of values must be settled once and for all, the 
relationship between principles is dynamic. The balancing of goods may in one case lead to 
the result that principle A prevails over the colliding principle B, but under different 
144 Dinah Shelton, International law and ‘Relative Normativity’, in: Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law 
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circumstances principle B may be the stronger one. Although not static, an approach based 
on principles can provide a more predictable legal technique, which is particularly necessary 
in the absence of legitimate institutions which could deal authoritatively with the collision of 
values. Three steps will be necessary to outline the reconstruction of the constitutional 
approach to public international law as a theory of constitutional principles. They correspond 
to the three steps which can be distinguished in legal argumentation when legal principles 
are applied. First, the constitutional norms, which later operate as principles, must be 
formulated. Secondly, the norm must be qualified as a principle, and thirdly the principle must 
be applied. As far as unwritten international law is concerned, all three steps are precarious.  
 
1. The Formulation of Constitutional Norms as General Principles 
It is submitted that, beyond treaty law, constitutional public interest norms do exist in 
unwritten international law as general principles of law in the sense of Article 38 para. 1 lit. c 
of the ICJ Statute. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute summarizes the function of the International 
Court of Justice in relation to the law it must apply.
150 Accordingly, sources doctrine offers 
two perspectives on international law and refers to its creation as well as to its application. 
International conventions and international custom (Article 38 para. 1 lit. a and b) are both 
procedures of norm creation and of norm application. One might doubt the character of 
custom as an effective instrument of intentional law-making. Still, states can bring about 
international norms by establishing a certain practice supported by their opinio iuris. Under 
certain circumstances, the passage of only a short period of time is not a bar to the formation 
of a new rule of customary law.
151  General principles, by contrast, hardly have this 
instrumental character. The recognition of a principle of international law will take more time. 
For this reason, we take the view that Article 38 para. 1 lit. c of the Statute is primarily 
addressed to judicial practice. In that respect, it resembles Article 38 para. 1 lit. d of the 
Statute. Our interpretation is confirmed by the agreement within the Committee of Jurists of 
1920 that the first purpose of para. 1 lit c was to avoid a non liquet.
152
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 However, general 
principles are not meaningless in the process of norm creation. They may guide the 
formulation of ordinary norms of international law. Due to their relevance for the content of 
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other legal norms, they are not only a formal but also a material source of public international 
law.
153
Amongst general principles of public international law, three categories can be distinguished 
on the basis of their origin.
 
154  Apart from principles taken from generally recognised 
provisions of domestic law, Article 38 para. 1 lit. c of the ICJ Statute comprises general 
principles originating in international relations and general principles applicable to all kinds of 
legal relations. Accordingly, general principles can be transferred from national legal orders 
by qualified methods of comparative law but also originate in international relations 
themselves.
155 The latter category comprises not only principles inherent in the international 
legal community, but also principles generally recognised on the international level.
156 
Despite their possibly moral content, principles are not derived from natural law but 
essentially depend on an established consent. Some kind of moral superiority might be 
derived from the fact that principles, which cannot be changed overnight, normally enshrine 
long-term interests. Apparently, there is no need to restrict Article 38 para. 1 lit. c of the ICJ 
Statute to principles developed in foro domestico. The original limitation to recognition within 
national legal orders was owed to the fact that this provided the only way to validate general 
principles in a reliable way at the time of the creation of the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice.
157
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bilateralism and, above all, in consequence of the creation of countless international 
organisations and the proliferation of international treaties. Today, we can refer to the implicit 
consensus expressed in resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which 
are not directly binding themselves, to preambles of multilateral treaties, which not only serve 
interstate but community interests, and to other expressions of consent in a globalised and 
transnationalised society like the judgements  of national and international courts.
158 
Essentially, the technique of the lawyer in formulating principles is still a generalisation on the 
basis not only of a qualified comparison of norms, but also of statements about the law in 
context. There is no obvious reason to qualify statements of state representatives in 
international fora as mere lip service which is irrelevant for the development of international 
law and not to take states at their word.
159 By contrast to (traditional) customary international 
law, state practice does not serve as a formal confirmation here but only as a possible 
indication of the existence of a more abstract principle. Practice is only one factor amongst 
others in determining the existence of an opinio iuris.
160
The formulation of Article 38 para. 1 lit. c of the ICJ Statute, which refers to the general 
principles of law “recognized by civilized nations”, is meaningful for all three categories of 
norms. In the post-colonial pluralistic world, the article must not refer to the national law of 
certain states only. A principle taken from domestic legal orders must be adhered to by the 
prevailing number of nations within each of the main families of laws.
 
161 In an even more 
ambitious manner, the clause has been interpreted as a limitation to a fundamental standard 
of basic human values which must be recognised in any legal community.
162
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interpretation may still be refined. On that basis, the finding of norms in international relations 
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formal and material principles to bring the elements of recognition in the international 
community and of “civilization” together (see infra part 3). 
 
General principles are not only relevant in case of veritable “lacunae” in treaty law and 
custom.
163 The recourse to general principles, however, must be premised on the judgement 
that a certain situation is to be regulated by international law (Regelungsbedürfnis).
164 This 
judgement must not simply be equated with the idea that treaty and customary law are 
unsatisfactory in some respect, but such a judgement need not already be supported by 
customary international law.
165  Arguably, the necessary judgement comes close to the 
criterion of transferability of domestically recognised principles to the international sphere. A 
need to transfer principles of national constitutional law can be ascertained where public 
international law is structurally equivalent to state constitutions but lacks the adequate 
provisions. Accordingly, the identification of a need for recourse to principles also amounts to 
a comparison.
166
It is submitted that the constitutional principles of universal respect for human rights, of 
democratic legitimacy or accountability and of the rule of law, but also the principle of respect 
for the environment, can be established as general principles of international law.
 In this context, both the expansion of public international law to areas which 
formerly belonged exclusively to the domaine réservé and its development from a mere law 
of coordination to a hierarchical order matter because superiority is an essential attribute of 
constitutional norms. This particularly applies to the law of international organisations, which 
decide on questions with important effects on individuals. 
167  In 
normative terms, these principles should correspond to the Rawlsian concept of the 
overlapping consensus and should be compatible with many different schemes of life in 
different countries.
168
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2. Qualification of the Legal Norm as a Principle 
To make these principles manageable, they must be qualified in a certain manner, which has 
been developed in legal theory for constitutional rights, but can be transferred to public 
international law.
169  Especially two features are common to constitutional rights and 
international law. They both tend to be comparatively indeterminate and often raise issues 
that are politically highly controversial.
170
Robert Alexy and his disciples have elaborated a theory of principles as a theory of legal 
argumentation about constitutional rights in the German Basic Law.
 
171 It is, however, not the 
only account of principles. In legal theory, five aspects of legal principles have been 
distinguished.
172 According to a traditional understanding a theory of principles is a theory 
about the structure of law and, particularly, about the relation of law to justice and morality.
173 
A more contested concept is that of principles as a distinct category of norms which is to be 
distinguished from rules.
174 This theory about the structure of individual norms is taken to be 
the basis for the methodological distinction between the techniques of subsumption and 
balancing.
175  Furthermore, influential proponents of a theory of principles understand 
principles as arguments and the attached theory as a theory of argumentation.
176  More 
specifically,  constitutional rights norms are understood as principles.
177
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aspects are more or less closely connected. In particular, the methodological aspect 
depends on the structural aspect. For international law, constitutional principles have been 
established as a basis for the rules of engagement in the discourse between national and 
international courts.
178
Usually, principles are distinguished from rules. For this distinction, several criteria have 
been brought forward. Raz holds that rules prescribe  specific acts, whereas principles 
prescribe highly unspecific actions. According to him, the distinction between rules and 
principles is one of degree which knows many borderline cases.
 
179 Dworkin, by contrast, 
distinguishes legal rules and legal principles  logically. Rules are applicable in an all-or-
nothing fashion. Principles, by contrast, do not set out legal consequences that follow 
automatically when the conditions provided are met. They state reasons that argue in one 
direction, but they do not necessitate a particular decision. They have a dimension of weight 
or importance. Consequently, whilst one rule cannot be valid if two rules conflict, intersecting 
principles lead to a conflict which must be resolved by taking into account the relative weight 
of each.
180 Others qualify principles as reasons for the existence of certain rules which give 
meaning to a cluster of rules as tending towards the realisation of a common objective,
181 
while still others contrast principles, which always serve to protect a common or an individual 
good, with rules, which are, in general, conduct-related.
182
For Alexy, the decisive point in distinguishing rules from principles is that principles are 
optimization requirements. They require that something be realised to the greatest extent 
possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Rules, by contrast, are always either fulfilled 
or not. Alexy insists that the distinction is not one of degree, but of kind. We do not want to 
dwell on that point. Still, the different functions of rules and principles in legal discourse are 
important for our approach. International constitutional norms should function in legal 
discourse as preferences and requirements of justification. In the words of Alexy, a principle 
posits an “ideal-ought”. Its  weight in concrete cases is determined by its background 
justification as it applies to the given context. It is trumped whenever some competing 
principle has greater weight in the case at hand. Rules, by contrast, are not necessarily set 
aside just because their background justifications do not hold up in the context of a particular 
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case.
183
 
 International human rights, as much as constitutional rights, can be understood as 
optimization requirements. The same should apply for principles of democratic accountability 
and of the rule of law. 
3. Application of the Principle 
In legal discourse, principles can fulfil several functions. Basically, a reference to principles 
can bring about a rationalisation of legal argumentation.
184  Rules themselves may make 
recourse to principles either expressly or implicitly,
185 or they can be interpreted in the light of 
underlying principles.
186 Furthermore, principles are relevant in constellations which are not 
governed by any rules: Here, legal principles may serve as authoritative  guidelines for 
balancing the competing interests.
187  From a post-modern, de-constructivist perspective, 
general principles have been interpreted as an example of “constructivist” thinking in the 
practice of the law and in legal scholarship. Whilst, in the practice of the law, principles guide 
legal argumentation, they are used in scholarship as a description and a systematization of 
the totality of individual norms. In both areas, the “constructivist” activity is deemed to consist 
in investing the law with evaluative and goal-rational meanings, such that it carries normative 
consequences. A normative theory of principles aims both at a rationalisation of and a better 
control over judicial decision-making and at more explanatory force.
188 So far, the actual 
practice of reference to principles, e.g., in the jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice, admittedly, has merely provided convenient arguments to ensure that formal 
coherence is reached.
189
The limitative function of principles, however, can considerably be increased when certain 
methodological consequences are recognised. Alexy has shown convincingly that balancing 
is a refined legal technique. It might be an unnecessary over-simplification of legal 
methodology to dichotomously distinguish between subsumption and balancing as two legal 
techniques.
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indirect character. In such constellations, the status of a principle as jus cogens gives a very 
strong indication of the outcome of the balancing.
191
The constitutional principles of international law should be applied by any international court 
or tribunal, which should always take into account that the balancing of principles generally 
does not provide for strict answers but leaves some leeway to the competent body, be it a 
state or an international organisation. This aspect also assures that principles are poorly 
suited to hegemonic use. Nevertheless, they can explain why it is plausible to maintain the 
idea that there is not only a formal but also a material unity of international law. Furthermore, 
principles should percolate down into domestic fora.
 The principles provide the framework for 
any exercise of authority. Still, this does not mean that international institutions and states 
are strictly bound by them. The higher the standard of democratic legitimacy of a decision-
making body, the more elaborate its mechanisms of participation and accountability in a 
concrete case, the larger will become its margin of appreciation under public international 
law. From this perspective, it makes a difference whether sovereign decisions of a 
democratic state only affect its own citizens or whether they have transboundary impacts.  
192
 
  They make a claim for universal 
respect. As they leave substantial discretion to state authorities, they could also be applied 
by national courts to enhance constitutional legitimacy. In that sense, one can talk of a 
radiating effect of international constitutional principles. 
E. Conclusions 
Constitutionalisation of public international law, on the one hand, can be used as a 
meaningful concept only if one takes into consideration that the concept of a constitution is 
different from the same term familiar at the domestic level; on the other hand, talking about 
constitutionalisation presupposes that some norms in international law serve  particular 
functions. Those functions embrace a certain notion of measuring the use of power, be it 
used by states or international organisations. Under this perspective, fundamental norms as 
well as the U.N. Charter, for different reasons, can be referred to as constitutional norms only 
to a very limited extent. By contrast, in the law of international organisations, elements can 
be found which point at a constitutional function of a certain set of norms which structure the 
organisations’ decision-making  in a legal way. These norms constitute minimum 
requirements of accountability, checks and balances as well as human rights. It is submitted 
here that these norms are to be perceived as principles in a dual sense. With respect to the 
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catalogue of sources of international law, these norms may well be understood as general 
principles in the sense of Article 38 para. 1 lit. c of the ICJ Statute. In terms of legal theory, 
they operate as principles in legal discourse. They fulfil constitutional functions by enhancing 
the level of rationality in legal discourse about the limits to the exercise of authority by states 
and international organisations. Gains in objectivity achieved by applying the adequate 
method of balancing principles, instead of the attempt to establish hierarchies of values, 
cannot belie institutional deficits especially on the universal plane. Democratic legitimacy, in 
the sense of accountability towards the governed, still asks for institutional changes. 
However, constitutional principles have the potential to provide for a certain degree of unity in 
international law, however fragmented the landscape of international organisations may 
appear. 
 